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This article questions whether sufficient attention is given to addressing violations of socio-
economic rights in the transitional justice context. Economic and Social rights (ESR) are rights 
associated with areas such as health, education, employment and housing. They are binding 
international legal standards and their protection extends to some of the most vulnerable groups in 
society. Transitional justice is the discipline examining the mechanisms through which the wrongs 
of a prior regime can be addressed when a state moves from illiberal regime to liberal democracy.  
The discourse has focussed increasing attention on socio-economic dimensions of transitional 
justice without fully grasping the nature or status of socio-economic rights law. This article uses a 
legal perspective in order to ask whether theories of prioritisation, judicial incrementalism and 
deliberative democracy will assist in ensuring pre-transition structural inequalities are addressed as 
part of the transitional justice paradigm and in accordance with international law requirements. It 
is argued that the emerging approach of addressing socio-economic rights violations through 
means of reparation may fail to address the structural inequalities associated with the prior regime. 
This article proposes that new and alternative structures must be imagined if the transitional 
justice discipline is to adequately address socio-economic violations in an emerging democracy with 
a view to establishing long term peace. 
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Following on from the Second World War nations 
throughout the world sought to declare a 
commitment to dignity and human rights. This 
culminated in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948 followed by two subsequent 
Covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR). 1 These treaties are known collectively as 
the International Bill of Rights. The international 
human rights structure comprises of civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights as established 
in the International Bill of Rights. Civil and political 
rights include rights such as the right to a fair trial 
or the right to vote. Economic, social and cultural 
rights include rights such as the right to education, 
the right to fair employment conditions, the right 
to adequate housing and the right to adequate 
healthcare. It was intended that the each of the 
rights (civil, political, economic, social and cultural) 
would be implemented concurrently and according 
to the principle of indivisibility.2 Subsequent 
international treaties at both the international and 
regional level have confirmed the legally binding 
status of these rights and their indivisible nature.  
 
The principle of indivisibility is an 
important aspect of the purpose and function of 
human rights and means that the fulfilment and 
enjoyment of one right is dependent on the 
protection and fulfilment of another (Whelan 
2010). That is to say for example that the right to 
life is dependent on the right to adequate health 
care, the right to an adequate standard of living 
and the right to adequate housing. Likewise, full 
enjoyment of the right to vote and the right to 
political participation is dependent on exercise of 
the right to education and the right freedom of 
expression, the right to protest or the right to 
collectively bargain. The full enjoyment of civil and 
political (CP) rights is therefore dependent on the 
                                         
1 The International Bill of Rights comprises of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights 1948 , GA Res 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights GA Res 2200A (XXI) 
of 16 December 1966 and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights UN General Assembly, 16 December 
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, GA Res. 2200A (XXI), 3 
Jan. 1976 
2 UN GA Res. 543 VI, 5 February 1952 (Craven 1995 p.9) 
protection and fulfilment of ESC rights – the 
preparatory work to the international treaties 
reveals that protecting civil and political rights and 
not economic social and cultural rights was 
considered an “anachronism in the twentieth 
century to provide for the protection of one 
without the other.”3 
 
Economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights 
have been the focus of concerned scholars who 
note it is ‘difficult to raise the question [of 
economic, social and cultural rights] outside the 
accepted transitional justice (TJ) discourse’ (Miller 
2008). Schmid and Nolan (2015) have argued that, 
although there has been an increasing emphasis on 
addressing economic and social dimensions of 
transitional justice in the discourse, these 
discussions suffer from ‘terminological and 
conceptual confusion’. This article seeks to clarify 
some of these ambiguities. In an analysis of the TJ 
literature Muvingi (2009) identifies that the most 
widely accepted conception of universal justice is 
grounded in international human rights, and many 
transitional justice scholars have, unsurprisingly, 
emphasized the primacy of human rights 
standards. However, as the discipline emerged and 
almost without exception, legal understandings of 
binding international human rights law in the TJ 
context referenced civil and political rights, which 
is in large part a reflection of the bias in the human 
rights field. Schmid and Nolan (2014) notably 
conclude that the claims made by transitional 
justice scholars with regard to ESR frequently 
appear to be founded on misconceptions about the 
substantive content and the existing scholarship 
relating to ESC rights. The international human 
rights legal regime solidifies the universality of 
equality in all rights (civil, political, economic, social 
and cultural). From its inception the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948 was founded on 
the belief that all human rights were indivisible and 
inalienable. Historically, a dichotomy emerged 
between civil and political rights, on the one hand, 
and economic, social and cultural rights, on the 
other. The protection and enforcement of ESC 
rights was regarded as an area of political choice as 
opposed to mandatory obligation – this was based 
                                         
3 E/CN.4/529 Memorandum of Secretary General, Commission on 
Human Rights, Seventh Session, Agenda item 3, 29 March 1951 





on an erroneous interpretation of the legally 
binding nature of socio-economic rights – 
otherwise referred to as a ‘legal fiction’ (Tinta 
2007). Miller (2008) concedes that the absence of 
ESC rights standards in TJ societies is perhaps a 
non-deliberate oversight in the ever expanding 
field of transitional justice out of step with the 
international legal regime. The legal literature, 
practice and discourse now unequivocally 
recognises the indivisibility of cultural, civil, 
economic, political and social rights and the TJ 
discourse requires to re-examine the socio-
economic dimensions of transition in light of these 
developments.  
 
In her genealogy of transitional justice, Ruti 
Teitel describes the TJ field as, ‘the conception of 
justice associated with periods of political change, 
characterized by legal responses to confront the 
wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes’ 
(Teitel 2003, p.69). This definition of the 
transitional process is typical of the scholarly 
perspective which has predominantly focused on 
retributional justice (for crimes) and dealing with 
the past. Economics play almost no role in Teitel’s 
genealogy and there is no redistributive justice 
element included in her findings. In Jon Elster’s 
(2004) extensive discussion on the history of 
transitional justice he delves into the economic 
question in so far as the crucial monetary 
requirement to fund the transitional justice 
mechanisms. This is a valid point, but nonetheless, 
there is again no discussion of redistributive justice. 
Redistribution of wealth is therefore not 
considered a mandatory factor in achieving justice 
as part of the transition from war to peace in the 
transitional justice society. On the other hand, 
financial issues are not completely absent from the 
academic and political discussions. Rather than 
discuss redistribution, which is considered a 
political aspiration, the discourse focuses on the 
concept of compensation for victims, otherwise 
known as ‘reparations’ (Shelton 1992). In the 
context of the correlation between poverty and 
conflict and the corollary impact on the most 
vulnerable and marginalised, securing ESC rights 
are of paramount importance to securing a stable 
democracy post-conflict ‘as to the link between 
democracy and socio-economic rights, it is argued 
that the prospects of democracy are poor if the 
population is impoverished and illiterate, thus 
unable to make use of its participatory rights’ (Koch 
& Vedsted-Hansen 2006, p.62). They argue that in 
this respect the substantive protection of ESC 
rights is as important as CP rights in a functioning 
democracy and therefore ought to feature in the 
transitional justice process. Reparations alone risk 
acting as a ‘band-aid’ to a much deeper and wider 
deficit in the transitional context when structural 
inequalities remain unaddressed.  
 
Reparations have played an extremely 
prominent role within the discourse and feature as 
the emerging approach whereby some form of 
monetary compensation is offered as practical 
measure to address prior violations of an illegal 
regime (Hughes et al 2008).  For instance,  in tort 
law, reparations seek to instil resitutio in integrum 
(to restore to the original position) for the victim of 
a wrong, and, where that is not possible, a fiscal 
sum compensates instead. Reparation is a way of 
seeking to re-establish civic trust, acknowledge 
wrongdoing and provide a sense of satisfaction for 
the victim. Several difficulties arise from this 
scenario, primarily, the status of victimhood is 
often highly contested, reparations can thus 
become a source of further conflict. Second, 
reparations become part of the wider transitional 
infrastructure and their eventual payment depends 
upon the economic success of the new democratic 
state. Moreover, the actual economic beneficiaries 
of the conflict inadvertently avoid liability. Without 
redistribution of wealth and equality of access to 
ESR, the pre-transition divide between rich and 
poor will continue beyond the parameters of the 
transitional justice paradigm. UN Resolution 
2006/60/147 makes specific provisions for the right 
to compensation for victims of gross violations of 
international human rights law and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law. 
Resolution 2006/60/147 also provides a fully 
comprehensive definition of victimhood that 
includes a specific provision for those who have 
suffered ‘economic’ loss. This extends the existing 
theory of victimhood to include a redistributive 
element in international law. The Resolution opens 
the doors for redistributive justice within the 
transitional justice paradigm as a mandatory 
obligation of international law. 
 
One of the issues regarding victimhood is 
that often victim status can emerge as a ‘meta-





conflict’ around the conflict (Bell et al 2004). The 
politicisation of the victim can erect multiple 
boundaries for reparations when competing 
narratives over what really happened and who was 
responsible can mean some victims are denied 
reparative measures due to their  perceived 
‘complicity’ in the conflict. For example, the 
conflict in Northern Ireland has seen reparations 
mired in the politics of victimhood with initial 
reports denying victimhood status to those who 
were deemed terrorists (Bloomfield Report 1998). 
Subsequent research demonstrated that the 
average typology of victim in the Northern Ireland 
conflict was male, catholic and aged between 18-
25 years (Ni Aoláin 2000). The original concept of 
victimhood therefore excluded the large majority 
of those who suffered death and injury during the 
conflict (Morrissey & Smith 2002). Scholars have 
criticised the hierarchy that existed between state 
forces and non-state paramilitary actors (Rolston 
2001) (Morrissey & Smith 2002). A consequence of 
this hierarchy made it difficult to deal with the 
issue of reparations without further exacerbating 
the meta-conflict around victimhood status and 
competing narratives of what happened. In 
addition to the difficulty around the hierarchy of 
victimhood, what type of reparations should be 
delivered to a  heterogeneous victim profile can 
also be a contested space with different types of 
victims needing different types of remedies.  
 
Reparations in international law 
 
The Committee on ESC Rights has stipulated the 
provision of reparation measures when a victim or 
group of victims has suffered an ESC violation. 
These measures include restitution, compensation, 
satisfaction or guarantees of non-repetition.4 
Reparation for the violation of an international 
human right does not necessarily mean the remedy 
must be provided via the court, nor does it mean 
that the solution is purely fiscal. Shelton (1998) 
suggests that reparation in international law can be 
both punitive and compensatory and that the 
                                         
4 ‘Any person or group who is a victim of a violation of the right to 
adequate food should have access to effective judicial or other 
appropriate remedies at both national and international levels. All 
victims of such violations are entitled to adequate reparation, which 
may take the form of restitution, compensation, satisfaction or 
guarantees of non-repetition.’ General Comment No. 12 Report on the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 20th Sess. 32 UN. 
Doc. E/2000/22 (1999) The Right to adequate Food 
method of delivery of restitution may be monetary, 
or can consist of apologies, declarations or the 
construction of monuments etc (Shelton 1998). 
These forms of reparation can be delivered by the 
state in accordance with international obligations 
without the need for a victim to seek a judicial 
remedy. However, where there is no adequate 
reparation by the state for gross violations of 
human rights, the victim(s) may seek a judicial 
remedy to rectify this. Tinta (2007) argues that, 
according to international law any violation of a 
primary rule, including those concerning ESC rights, 
ought to be open to an effective judicial remedy. 
Just as states can be liable for violations of civil and 
political rights, so too can they be liable for 
violations of ESC rights (Tinta 2007). This view is 
reflected in the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1998): 
 
It is now undisputed that all human rights 
are indivisible, interdependent, 
interrelated and of equal importance for 
human dignity. Therefore, states are as 
responsible for violations of economic, 
social and cultural rights as they are for 
violations of civil and political rights... As is 
the case with civil and political rights, both 
individuals and groups can be victims of 
violations of economic, social and cultural 
rights.5 
 
Reparations also feature as a remedy identified in 
the UN Resolution on the Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law.6 
Paragraph 15 provides: 
 
Adequate, effective and prompt 
reparation is intended to promote 
justice by redressing gross violations of 
international human rights law or 
serious violations of international 
                                         
5 The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Maastricht, January 22-26, 1997, [1998] 20 Human 
Rights Quarterly 691 
6 UN General Assembly, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to 
a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 21 
March 2006, A/RES/60/147 





humanitarian law. Reparation should 
be proportional to the gravity of the 
violations and the harm suffered. In 
accordance with its domestic laws and 
international legal obligations, a state 
shall provide reparation to victims for 
acts or omissions which can be 
attributed to the state and constitute 
gross violations of international human 
rights law or serious violations of 
international humanitarian law. In 
cases where a person, a legal person, 
or other entity is found liable for 
reparation to a victim, such a party 
should provide reparation to the victim 
or compensate the state if the state 
has already provided reparation to the 
victim. 
 
Paragraph 8 of the Resolution defines a victim as 
follows: 
 
For purposes of the present document, 
victims are persons who individually or 
collectively suffered harm, including 
physical or mental injury, emotional 
suffering, economic loss or substantial 
impairment of their fundamental 
rights, through acts or omissions that 
constitute gross violations of 
international human rights law, or 
serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. Where appropriate, 
and in accordance with domestic law, 
the term “victim” also includes the 
immediate family or dependants of the 
direct victim and persons who have 
suffered harm in intervening to assist 
victims in distress or to prevent 
victimization. 
 
The obligation to provide restitution is therefore 
firmly embedded in international law with a focus 
on facilitating remedies at the domestic level. If the 
state fails to implement adequate reparation, an 
individual or group would have the right to seek a 
justiciable remedy to ‘wipe-out all the 
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the 
situation which would, in all probability, have 
existed if that act had not been committed.’7 
 
Tinta (2007) refers to jurisprudence in the 
transitional justice context concerning a massacre 
in Guatemala, which affected hundreds of 
displaced victims of the internal war. The court 
ordered reparation measures that included 
measures of satisfaction such as establishing 
development programmes on health, education, 
and infrastructure in the affected communities. 
These programmes included providing such 
communities with medical care, educational 
programs in the native language of the victims and 
essential services such as access to drinkable 
water.  
 
In a similar vein, Laplante (2007) has also 
identified transitional justice mechanisms that 
facilitate remedies in the way of reparations. For 
example, in 2003 the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) in Peru made recommendations 
that included criminal trials, institutional reforms 
and a reparation programme: the Plan Integral de 
Reparaciones (PIR). The TRC examined the causes 
of the conflict and acknowledged that economic, 
social and cultural inequalities fuelled the 
insurgency. Although the Commission did not 
suggest that poverty was the primary cause of the 
violence the report stated that poverty was ‘one of 
the factors that contributed to igniting [the 
conflict] and as the backdrop against which this 
drama unfolded.’(LaPlante 2007, p.153). Laplante 
(2007) concludes that there was a ‘cause and 
effect’ interaction between violations of ESC rights 
and the conflict.  Those living in deprivation before 
the conflict, were most vulnerable to violations of 
human rights during the conflict, and remained in a 
state of exacerbated deprivation following the 
conflict.  As a result, after decades of entrenched 
inequality, it is more difficult for families and 
communities to recuperate social and economic 
stability and security in a post-conflict society. The 
TRC concluded that ‘the internal armed conflict 
paralyzed the process of development of the rural 
world and left grave consequences in the 
productive structure, social organisation, 
educational institutions and proyectos de vida (life 
                                         
7 This is the general principle of reparation in international law as 
decided in Re Factory at Chorzów (Germ. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 
No. 17 (Sept. 13), para.125 





projects) of the affected population. [W]ith respect 
to human capital and the ransacking and 
destruction of the community assets, it is possible 
to conclude that the process of violence left a 
despairing economic panorama with an immense 
number of affected people, to whom society and 
the state owe reparations.’( LaPlante 2007, p.157) 
On this basis the distribution of reparations was to 
play a pivotal role in redressing violations of ESC 
rights during the conflict. 
 
The issue of reparations must also be 
considered within the wider legal and 
constitutional transformation of a transitional 
state. In the case of Peru, Laplante highlights some 
concerns with reparational schemes and the 
constitutional and legal transformation that is 
required in a post-conflict state to remedy the 
deprivation caused by the conflict. Although many 
victims express a desire for economic reparations, 
they often remain unsatisfied with ‘simple band-aid 
solutions’ or one-off payments. Reparations can 
fulfil an important sense of empowerment for the 
victim, however, they can also serve to undermine 
fulfilment of substantive change or entrench 
conflict between different groups trying to access 
the same limited resources – particularly when 
structural inequalities are left unaddressed.  
 
Individual reparations arguably ‘pit the 
poor against the poor-victims’ in the struggle for 
limited resources. It is important to note that 
reparations are not a cure-all in post conflict 
recovery. If reparations are not accompanied by 
institutional, social and economic reform then the 
goals of prevention may be frustrated. A 
comparison can be drawn between providing 
reparations for victims and providing for former 
prisoners or combatants in Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) schemes. 
Shirlow and McEvoy (2008) highlight that in the 
Northern Ireland context many of the combatants 
and prisoners come from socially and economically 
deprived areas and are reintegrated back into 
poverty and structural exclusion creating a poverty 
cycle which further entrenches segregation 
between communities. They urge that 
reconciliation requires an acknowledgement that it 
is the responsibility of governments to ameliorate 
the structural conditions of poverty and social 
exclusion which feed the prejudicial attitudes and 
behaviour first leading to conflict (Shirlow & 
McEvoy 2008). When existing hegemonic 
structures of inequality create a hierarchy of socio-
economic rights, reparational measures are 
unlikely to suffice requiring a more substantive 
restructuring of conflicted societies which 
addresses violations of socio-economic rights. In 
this sense socio-economic rights and violations of 
these rights require further attention if the 
transitional discourse is going to move beyond a 
debate on how reparations should be delivered. 
The systemic problems associated with poverty and 
social exclusion that exacerbate, if not cause, 
conflict require more attention in the discourse. 
 
An alternative to the reparational approach 
 
Fuller (2012) has argued for a theory of 
prioritisation in a transitional society that would 
support a more holistic solution than that offered 
by arbitrary reparational measures. She suggests 
that the transition to a more just society depends 
upon society as a whole sharing the burden of the 
transitional process (Fuller 2012). According to the 
theory of prioritisation, those who are the most 
vulnerable and marginalised ought to be ‘lifted-up’ 
first and then the transition can move on to the 
next phase where the needs of the ‘next-worst off’ 
are addressed. No one person is subject to a more 
grievous injustice in order to rectify another 
group’s unjust condition and so those at the top of 
the hierarchy bear the greatest burden as they wait 
the longest to benefit from reforms. Fuller argues 
that ‘this is as it should be, since members who are 
located near the bottom of the social hierarchy 
already bear the heavy burden of diminished 
welfare and liberty, relative to those at the top.’ 
 
On this basis, prioritising those who are the 
most vulnerable in society is fairer than prioritising 
reforms that benefit those who are at the top: 
 
By contrast, one might imagine a 
transitional process in which a 
burdened society becomes more just 
by first guaranteeing the rights it is 
easiest to guarantee, namely those of 
the middle and upper classes, after 
which they make slow incremental 
gains in securing some rights to the 
bottom economic quartile of society. 





Such a society, even if it were to 
ultimately become just or decent by 
such a process, would not have arrived 
there in a transitionally just manner, 
since it placed the burdens of 
transition on those who were already 
the most vulnerable. (Fuller 2012, 
p.384) 
 
This might be the most difficult to establish in a 
political sense, because, as Fuller notes, it would be 
easier to secure better conditions for the middle 
and upper classes rather than those who are 
socially, economically or politically marginalised. In 
this sense, the non-elected judiciary could arguably 
play the crucial supervisory role in order to ensure 
the substantive fulfilment of ESC rights is 
prioritised for the most vulnerable by the 
legislature and executive within the transitional 
context, in particular for a society that has faced 
deep rooted prejudice and severe social inequality. 
Teitel (2000) has examined the development of an 
emerging theory of ‘transitional constitutionalism’ 
in the transitional justice sphere and notes the 
fundamental role that the judiciary can play in the 
transitional justice process by establishing the rule 
of law, and engendering legitimacy in the rule of 
law, post-conflict. In this sense, transitional 
constitutionalism can perform a dual role in 
addressing the past whilst also laying foundations 
for the future. 
 
Rather than view judicial supremacy as 
imposing or usurping the sovereignty of the 
legislature, the case for a substantive rights-based 
conception of the rule of law would bind both the 
legislature and the judiciary to a set of 
fundamental principles from which neither could 
derogate. The transitional justice process could 
arguably present as an emerging constitutional 
framework within Teitel’s transitional 
constitutionalist theory, meaning that human rights 
ought to  acquire norm-based status de jure and de 
facto following a foundationalist role in any peace 
process or multilateral transition to liberal regime. 
In this sense the indivisibility of rights, and a rights-
based approach would act as the new structural 
regime against which previous structures would be 
measured allowing for a systematic approach to 
addressing structural inequalities. 
 
The literature suggests that addressing ESC 
violations in the aftermath of conflict is a 
contentious issue. Reparational mechanisms have 
become part of the established discourse which 
seeks to rectify the absence of ESC discussions in 
the transitional justice paradigm. Fuller’s theory of 
prioritisation offers a potential framework for a 
more holistic approach to redistribution in the 
conflicted democracy where it is envisaged the 
court could play a critical role in holding the 
legislature and executive to account in ensuring 
that ESC violations are addressed.  
 
Reconceptualising through theories of 
prioritisation, judicial incrementalism and 
deliberative democracy 
 
In terms of ESC adjudication, the South African 
example has been developed by a cautious 
judiciary that has employed a theory of deference 
or judicial restraint in order to try and strike a 
balance in the separation of powers and with the 
objective of ensuring that concerns relating to 
polycentricity and the allocation of budgetary 
resources are adequately addressed within the 
confines of the court’s jurisprudence (Davis 2006). 
This approach has been both welcomed and 
criticised concurrently in the literature. Those who 
welcome the cautious approach argue that the 
judiciary has succeeded in striking the correct 
balance (King 2011) (Sunstein 2001) (Kende 2003). 
Cass Sunstein has suggested that the deferential 
standard of review in socio-economic rights cases is 
‘novel and exceedingly promising’ and ‘respectful 
of democratic prerogatives and of the limited 
nature of public resources, while also requiring 
special deliberative attention to those whose 
minimal needs are not being met.’(Sunstein, 2001, 
p.234, p.237). Those critical of the approach 
suggest that the judiciary has been over-cautious 
and failed to secure any substantive content of the 
rights protected in the Constitution, undermining 
the foundational and norm-based nature of the 
Constitution and, as a result, has failed to realise 
the transformative potential of the Constitution 
envisaged as part of the transitional framework 
(Pieterse 2006) (Leidenberg & Goldblatt 2007) 
(Mbazira 2008). Pieterse has argued that if the 
court’s  jurisprudence ‘is to have any tangible 
significance for socio-economic rights' 
beneficiaries, the Constitutional Court needs to 





reverse its stance against the recognition of 
individually enforceable claims and to ground the 
affirmative remedies it awards in socio-economic 
rights cases in a purposive understanding of the 
entitlements entailed by the rights in 
question.’(Pieterse, 2006, p.490). 
 
The South African model adopts a mixture 
of substantive rights recognition, together with 
safeguards and limitation clauses contained in the 
constitution. Rights are also afforded protection to 
different degrees along the respect, protect, 
promote, fulfil axis (Section 7 of the Constitution). 
Some rights are afforded non-derogable status, 
such as rights relating to children.8 Other rights are 
considered to be subject to progressive realisation 
such as the right to access adequate housing and 
the right to access health care, food, water and 
social security.9 There is a general limitation clause 
under section 36 whereby rights may be limited if 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society.  
 
The primacy of the Constitution is 
protected under section 172 whereby a court must 
declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent 
with the Constitution is invalid and may make any 
order that is just and equitable in the 
circumstances. The declaration has no effect in law 
until it is confirmed by the Constitutional Court (so 
where a lower court makes an order the final 
decision on validity rests with the Constitutional 
Court). It is open to the lower courts to enforce an 
interim remedy pending the confirmation of the 
declaration by the Constitutional Court (section 
172(2)(b)). The declaration of invalidity can be 
limited as to its retrospective effect (section 
172(1)(b)(i)). Furthermore, similar to the ‘delayed 
remedy’ employed by the Canadian Supreme 
                                         
8 Such as the right to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse 
or degradation; and the right to be protected from exploitative labour 
practices (section 28(1)(d) and (e)). See section 37(5)(c) for a table 
listing non-derogable rights in the Constitution. For a discussion on the 
rights of the child (particularly girls’ ESC rights) in the South African 
Constitution see Ann Skelton, ‘Girls’ Socio-Economic Rights in South 
Africa’ [2010] 26 South African Journal of Human Rights 141  
9 For example, section 26 of the South African Constitution provides 
for the right to have access to adequate housing and section 27 
provides for the right to have access to health care, food, water and 
social security. The constitution further provides that the state must 
take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights 
(Sections 26(2) and 27(2) respectively) 
Court10, section 172(1)(b)(ii) provides that judges 
may make an order suspending the declaration of 
invalidity for any period and on any conditions, to 
allow the competent authority to rectify the defect. 
This framework affords a great deal of flexibility to 
the court in how best to develop jurisprudence and 
potential remedies for violations within the 
parameters of its constitutional authority. The 
options of remedial action are open ended (the 
court may make any order that is ‘just and 
equitable’) and at the same time the impact of the 
orders can be controlled temporally (with the 
option to limit the retrospective effect of a 
declaration, suspend the prospective application in 
the immediate future and seek to apply interim 
measures in the meantime).  
The great difficulty in affording flexibility in this 
respect relates to how the judiciary in South Africa 
should approach the degree of protection that 
ought to be afforded to those rights that are 
subject to progressive realisation within the states 
available resources on a case by case basis. Does 
the constitutional recognition of ESC rights in this 
way confer authority on the court to interfere in 
relation to how state resources are allocated? And, 
if so, is this interference workable in practice 
without a juridification of politics? 
 
This concern essentially relates to the 
argument that such a constitutional power invites 
the judiciary to engage in issues of a high policy 
nature, and offer remedies that will simply shift 
around money within the respective department 
rather than increase overall funding (King 2011). 
There is the risk that adjudication will lead to the 
development of ESC constitutional norms on a case 
by case basis, potentially drawing public funds from 
one policy area to another without a holistic 
approach to resource allocation. This could for 
example lead to the allocation of funds from the 
                                         
10 See for example the delayed remedy employed in Canada (Attorney 
General) v Bedford 2013 SCC 72 in which the Supreme Court 
suspended the declaration of invalidity under section 52(1) of 
Canada’s Constitution Act 1982 for one year to allow Parliament 
sufficient time to avoid an eventual regulatory void. This case 
concerned the legality of prohibitions on sex workers that the court 
found violated the safety and security of prostitutes – the difficulty 
with the delayed remedy route places those at risk to remain in a state 
of violation during the interim period in which the declaration of 
invalidity is suspended. For a discussion on this case and the 
constitutional impact of delayed remedies see : Robert Leckey, ' 
Suspended Declarations of Invalidity and the Rule of Law' U.K. Const. L. 
Blog (12th March 2014) (available at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/)  





poorest in society to the wealthy. An example of 
this is evident in a Brazilian case where the court 
recognised an immediately enforceable right to the 
highest attainable health causing greater health 
inequities as the more privileged and wealthy 
gained access to costly health care (Ferraz 2009). In 
relation to this risk, King argues that it is possible 
‘to develop a theory of adjudication that gives us 
good reason to believe that when paying Paul, we 
are not always robbing Peter to do it’ (King 2011, 
p.56).  
 
King develops a theory of adjudication 
based on judicial restraint and incrementalism as a 
viable solution to ESC constitutionalisation and 
adjudication. Judicial restraint, he argues can be 
managed through the consideration of four 
principles that should temper the incremental 
development of jurisprudence: democratic 
legitimacy (legislative supremacy with strong 
judicial oversight); polycentricity (that the court 
have regard to the policy focussed allocation of 
resources and use discretion and flexible remedies) 
; expertise (the court should exercise deference in 
relation to areas outside of the court’s competence 
balanced with an approach which examines 
potential procedural failings); and flexibility 
(flexibility in terms of setting precedent for future 
development and flexibility in terms of remedies 
offered). By incrementalism, King argues that the 
principles of restraint will require only a very small 
departure from the status quo as the common law 
develops on an incremental basis – when dealing 
with issues of significant macro-policy (large scale 
polycentric issues), there ought to be, according to 
King, a significant degree of administrative and/or 
legislative flexibility by way of response to any 
judgment. King has identified South Africa as a 
constitutional model that provides an exemplary 
solution to this theory of adjudication. 
 
It is argued that a combination of theories 
of prioritisation and judicial incrementalism offers 
a more appropriate model for addressing ESC rights 
in the post-conflict context than a ‘one-off’ 
reparational regime. The conceptual space through 
which these two theoretical approaches can be 
addressed can be found in the application of 
principles of deliberative democracy. Deliberative 
democracy can apply at both the micro and macro 
level (Tierney 2012). At the micro level, 
constitutional transitions can be framed in terms of 
participatory and deliberative processes that are 
inclusive, fair, informed and seek to build 
consensus (Tierney & Boyle 2013). At the macro 
level deliberative democracy can be engaged by 
the institutions of state where the legislature, 
judiciary and executive each engage in a 
constitutional dialogue as states undergo 
transition. The adjudication of ESC rights is one 
such issue open to this type of dialogue whereby 
the court can deliberate on whether the legislature 
and executive are meeting international legal 
obligations and the state can respond by justifying 
actions in a transparent and democratic way. This 
is not necessarily to suggest that the court have the 
final say – with options such as structural interdicts 
available as remedies – however, this holistic 
approach is much more democratically accountable 
and facilitates a transparent dialogue on the state’s 
duty to address structural inequalities. This leaves 
scope within a deliberative democratic forum for 
Fuller’s theory of prioritisation to flourish between 




King (2011) develops a theory of democratic 
legitimacy based on the principles of elite 
deliberative democracy (deliberation between 
institutions) that ensures legislative focus on rights 
and the protection of marginalised groups under 
the overarching constitutional framework. 
Benhabib (2013) argues that there is a place for the 
principles of democratic legitimacy (exercised by 
the legislature) and judicial oversight (exercised by 
the court through the constitution) - and that both 
these approaches can co-exist.  
 
Benhabib (2013) identifies that 
representative democracy and formulation of 
rights through deliberation in the legislature 
complements a substantive rights based 
foundationalist approach to constitutionalism 
affording legally enforceable justiciable rights – and 
in the same vein a constitutional arrangement 
complements and benefits from a legislative 
system which engages with contextualising rights 
as justiciable entitlements (Habermas 1996). 
Without the basic foundation creating an 
environment for political agency a person or 





collective cannot exercise self-governance. It is 
argued that the basic foundation requires, at the 
very least, a minimum of ESR protection (as well as 
civil and political) in order to legitimately fulfil the 
other roles of autonomy required in a democracy. 
This is of particular importance in the transitional 
justice context when vulnerable and marginalised 
groups may be subject to majoritarian rule or 
political representation skewed through a 
consociational framework. A foundation is required 
to guide the legislature and executive as to human 
rights compliance. The constitution can act as the 
foundation and the court can act as the 
accountability mechanism should the legislature 
and executive fail to comply. This facilitates a 
culture of political accountability and justifies the 
use of judicial review. Within the transitional 
justice paradigm the constitution can be used as a 
tool to focus the legislature and executive on 
substantive rights based considerations. At the 
same time it can afford the court a role in ensuring 
the legislature and executive embrace this role 
moving beyond a case by case reparational 
approach and embracing theories of prioritisation 
and incrementalism. 
This reconceptualisation of ESR in the transitional 
justice discipline helps address problems relating to 
reparational schemes that do not fully account for 
contested victimhood status, pervasive socio-
economic deprivation, underlying structural 
inequalities in addition to the heterogeneity of 
victims and the wide variety of needs they may 
have. A more robust approach is to be found in a 
holistic framework that addresses ESR violations by 
restructuring society in a way that ensures ESR 
protection is embedded in the emerging 
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